A talk by Guido Melchior (University of Graz)
Skepticism and two perspectives of self-reflection
Reflective human beings have the capacity to reflect on their own mental states from two distinct perspectives, from an ordinary 1st-person-perspective and from a 3rd-person-perspective by taking a detached point of view towards their own mental states that mimics reflection about mental states of others. Such 3rd-person-perspective is, for example, involved in methods of mindfulness and cognitive defusion in psychotherapy. In this paper, I investigate a particular instance of this capacity, namely reflecting on the truth of one’s own beliefs from two perspectives. As I will argue, these different perspectives can reveal different judgments about the truth of one’s own beliefs. Ordinary self-reflection from a 1st-person-perspective rather automatically leads to higher-level beliefs in the background that one’s own beliefs are true. Self-reflection from a 3rd-person-perspective, in contrast, can also lead to judgments that one’s own beliefs are false or to judgment suspension about the truth of one’s own beliefs. Each perspective has its merits and weaknesses. As I will argue, one version of the skeptical problem arises from two perspectives of self-reflection. While ordinary self-reflection from a 1st-person-perspective leads to common-sense anti-skepticism that our external world beliefs are true, self-reflection from a 3rd-person perspective supports a skeptical stance of judgement suspension about their truth.