Pascal's Concept of a Hatred against Truth.
Abstract: What is it that may prompt us to doubt beyond reason propositions about which, as rational minds we should be convinced of the truth with near certainty? What is it conversely that may prompt us to be persuaded by propositions our understanding should convince us, beyond reasonable doubt, of the falsehood? Are such tendencies merely relative to occasional contradictions between what should convince our mind and what may please or displease our will, or are they more structurally rooted within the very nature of the human self? In this paper, I follow the thread of these questions to provide a genesis of Pascal’s concept of a "mortal hatred" against certain truths in the Pensées (see Fr. S743 L978) from his earlier writings On The Art of Persuasion. I then explore some implications of his reflections on the source of such a hatred in the human self for his social and political theory.