
Aaron James: Hi Anastasia, first off I should congratulate you on the success of your recent book with Rachel Wiseman, What Are Children For? On Ambivalence and Choice. Tell us a little about it.
Anastasia Berg: Thanks so much, Aaron. The book explores the growing ambivalence about having children and the philosophical resources available to overcome it. Overcoming ambivalence does not necessarily mean choosing to have children. But it does mean being able to navigate the various challenges and anxieties that attend the decision—material, professional, romantic—and, of course, ethical-philosophical, whether feminist or universal. I’m pleased to report that the book enjoyed a very warm popular and professional reception. And I’ve had the privilege of touring the country to speak about it to different audiences.
AJ: Wonderful! And that led to further collaboration?
AB: Yes, after one visit, to the Population Research Center at the University of Texas, Austin— I was invited to collaborate with two of the center’s fellows, Dean Spears and Michael Geruso. We are going to look further into procreative preferences, differences between childlessness and declining birthrates among parents, and the efficacy of fertility-oriented policies.
AJ: And you bring a philosophical angle to those questions?
AB: Yes, alongside this relatively empirically heavy work, we’re exploring non-utilitarian approaches to procreation and population ethics, as well as the question of whether non-utilitarian approaches to population ethics can combine with anonymous and aggregative public policy decision-making.
AJ: Sounds like you’re not a utilitarian! I take it that connects with your exciting work on Immanuel Kant?
AB: I'm very keen to explore the possibility of affirming the value of human life, in the present and in the future, from a secular, liberal, non-utilitarian perspective. I confess that while Kant gives us the philosophical framework to think through the unique value — the worth — of individual human lives, I don’t think he provides us with concrete insights as far as the question of the legitimacy and goodness of a human future are concerned. But all my work is informed by a commitment to resisting consequentialist absolutism in ethics, and that's deeply informed by my study of Kant, as well as Aristotle, Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Kant taught me to appreciate the idea that the actualizations of our freedom are not exhausted by our making unencumbered decisions for ourselves, and that this requires a reckoning with our embodiment and our embeddedness--all circumstances that are out of our control. We need that philosophical context to think clearly about the role of children in human life.
AJ: In terms of contemporary philosophy, your stalking horse is David Benetar's "anti-natalism." Where does he go wrong?
AB: Yes, Benetar represents several deep philosophical tendencies I take issue with. I resist the idea that life is so full of suffering and failure that it would be wrong to subject anyone else to it. That thought leads to the intolerable conclusion that those who are materially less fortunate have thereby less of a moral justification in having children. But, surely, whatever money can buy you, the moral justification to have children should not be it. Those who choose to have children in more precarious circumstances—taking on greater risks to themselves and a greater set of challenges and duties on behalf of their children—are not less moral, but more brave. Our suffering is bound up with our vulnerability and the unpredictability of the future, and it is nonsense to think that the very fact of our finitude and susceptibility to harm renders the reproduction of human life immoral.
AJ: I see.
AB: I think this points to a deeper problem with the procreation and population ethics debate. Most assume that one can harm people by bringing them into existence and that one should refrain from doing so, if their quality of life is sufficiently low. Against this, I want to argue that what parents are responsible for is not the overall same of the wellbeing of their children, but preparing their children to meet life's challenges, uncertainties, disappointments and, yes, suffering.
AJ: And you think this helps us navigate the culture wars? Have liberals and progressives dropped the ball on the value of having children, allowing conservatives to corner the rhetorical market on "family values”?
AB: Conservatives' embrace of traditional gender roles as well as their assaults on reproductive rights do have a kind of discourse monopoly. That contributes to a growing aversion, and often antipathy, to the topic among liberals and progressives. While this is understandable, it is also important to recognize that one's position on reproductive rights and a commitment to gender equality does not imply an opposition to children.
AJ: You think the question is too important to let it be entirely politicized?
AB: Yes, and that’s because what's at stake in the question is not just what shape one's life will take, but also the value of human life itself, in the present and in the future. While political opponents might disagree about their ideals of what the good life might look like, insofar as one believes that it is good that humanity survives, and indeed thrives, one is committed to the goodness of some people taking up the responsibility of parenting.
AJ: But you also want to explain why ambivalence about parenting is natural?
AB: Yes, prospective parents might gain many things—ethical growth, artistic inspiration, intellectual insights; spiritual liberation; the pleasures of play, pride and love. At the same time, having children can also exact the highest material and emotional costs. You can hear this as a warning but you can also hear this as a reminder of the fact that to have children is to allow yourself to stand in a relationship whose essence is not determined by the benefits it confers or the prices it exacts. For one thing, as I said earlier, in deciding to have children we are making a contribution—by no means the only possible one, but a necessary one—to the very possibility of a flourishing human future.
AJ: Great, Anastasia, thanks so much for your time!
AB: My pleasure, Aaron.
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