This section contains archived content made available for reference, research, or recordkeeping purposes. These materials are not actively maintained and may not meet current accessibility standards, such as WCAG 2.1 Level AA. If you need assistance accessing this content or require an accessible format, please contact sohwebmaster@uci.edu. We are committed to ensuring access for all users and will provide accommodations promptly upon request.
"Functionalist Norms & Practical Stakes"
Many think that classical invariantism (CI) is the default view of the semantics of ‘know’, and many think that knowledge is the norm of assertion (KNA). The shiftiness dilemma challenges the claim that CI and KNA are compatible. What, then, is required to defeat the shiftiness dilemma? Mona Simion (2021) appeals to a functionalist framework of normativity in an attempt to provide independent grounds in support of CI/KNA compatibility. In this paper, I argue that Simion’s proposal falls short, but suggest that the functionalist need not worry. The problem with Simion’s proposal is that it attempts to derive all-things-considered norms from the function of individual organisms and the value of survival. The functionalist should instead derive such norms from the function of persons and the value of cooperation. Such an account not only enjoys more prior plausibility, but it does a better job explaining the relevant data.